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Since security is based on trust in authenticity as well as trust in protection, the 
weakest link in the security chain is often between the keyboard and chair.  We have a 
natural human willingness to accept someone at his or her word.  Attacking computer 
systems via information gained from social interactions is a form of social engineering.  
Attackers know how much easier it is to trick insiders instead of targeting the complex 
technological protections of systems.  In an effort to formalize social engineering, we are 
building two models: Trust and Attack.  Because social-engineering attacks are complex 
and typically require multiple visits and targets, these two models can be applied, 








































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  vii





A. OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING ................................................1 
B. SOCIAL ENGINEERING IMPLICATIONS ...............................................3 
C. PURPOSE OF STUDY....................................................................................4 
D. ORGANIZATION OF PAPER ......................................................................4 
II. BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................5 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................5 
B. CLOSE-ACCESS TECHNIQUES .................................................................6 
C. ONLINE SOCIAL ENGINEERING............................................................10 
D. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING.................................................................12 
III. PREVIOUS MODELS OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING..........................................15 
A. TRUST ............................................................................................................15 
1. Trust Definitions ................................................................................16 
2. Previous Trust Models.......................................................................18 
B. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURES .............................21 
C. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................23 
IV. A MODEL OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING..............................................................25 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................25 
B. TRUST MODEL ............................................................................................25 
C. ATTACK MODEL ........................................................................................28 
V. TAXONOMY APPLIED TO MITNICK’S EXAMPLES......................................31 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................31 
B. OUR TAXONOMY FOR ENCODING SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
ATTACKS ......................................................................................................31 
C. ENCODING OF THE MITNICK ANECDOTES ......................................33 
D. SUMMARY STATISTICS............................................................................37 
E. COUNTERMEASURES FROM EXPERIMENT......................................40 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK .................................................................43 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM EXPERIMENT .....................................43 
B. CONSTANT VIGILANCE ...........................................................................44 
C. MULTIMODAL TRAINING .......................................................................45 
D. FUTURE WORK...........................................................................................46 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................49 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................51 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  ix




Figure 1. Why Social Engineer (From Hermansson, 2005) ..............................................2 
Figure 2. Integrative Model of Organizational Trust (From Mayer, 1995) ....................19 
Figure 3. Trust Formation in Virtual Teams (From Hung, 2004) ...................................20 
Figure 4. Social-Engineering Trust Model......................................................................27 






























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  xi




ID  Identification 



















































Without Professor Craig H. Martell and Professor Neil C. Rowe’s advice and 
assistance this thesis would not have been possible. I greatly appreciate their gracious 
attitude and patience.   
I would also like to thank the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Operational Test 
and Evaluation Directorate, and the 92nd Information Warfare Aggressor Squadron for 
providing the necessary data and observation experiences.  
Last but not least, thank you to my husband, Trevor J. Laribee for all of his love, 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  1
I. INTRODUCTION  
With the ubiquity of computer information processing, the deadliest security 
vulnerability is literally in our hands.  Can we create a security patch for human nature?  
Unauthorized access to critical and even life-threatening data is prone to social 
engineering attacks, manipulation of authorized users to gain unauthorized access to a 
valued system and the information that resides on it.  Social engineering attacks are not 
confined to military defense programs, day-to-day activities such as banking and paying 
taxes can be affected.  “[This] report…reveals a human flaw in the security system that 
protects taxpayer data.  More than one-third of Internal Revenue Service employees and 
managers…provided their computer login and changed their password.” (Dalrymple, 
2006). 
A. OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
Intruders are always on the lookout for ways to gain access to valuable resources 
such as computer systems, or corporate or personal information on them that can be used 
maliciously for the attackers’ personal gain. Sometimes they get their chance when there 
are genuine gaps in the security that they can breach. Oftentimes, they get through 
because of human behaviors such as trust (when people are too trusting of others) or 
ignorance (people who are ignorant about the consequences of being careless with 
information).  Attackers know how much easier it is to trick insiders instead of targeting 
the complex technological protections that we spend huge monetary sums on.  Figure 1 
taken from (Hermansson, 2005) illustrates how the social engineer exploits the weakest 




Figure 1.   Why Social Engineer (From Hermansson, 2005) 
 
There are several methods that the malicious individual can use to try to breach 
the information security defenses of a personal computer or a network of systems. The 
human-centered approach termed social engineering is one of them.  There are two main 
categories under which all social engineering attempts can be classified: computer or 
technology-based deception, and human based deception.  The technology-based 
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approach is to deceive the user into believing that he is interacting with a bona fide 
communication entity (another user, company, or website) and get him to provide 
confidential information. For example, the user gets a popup window, informing him that 
the computer application has had a problem, and the user will need to re-authenticate in 
order to proceed. Once the user provides their identification and password on that pop-up 
window, the harm is done. The attacker who has created the popup now has the user’s 
identification (ID) and password and can access the network and the computer system.  
The human-based approach is done through deception, by taking advantage of the 
victim’s ignorance and the natural human inclination to be helpful and liked. For all 
intents and purposes, the technology-based approach is what this thesis will refer to as 
social engineering and the human based approach as the close access techniques. 
B. SOCIAL ENGINEERING IMPLICATIONS  
Social engineering attacks can result in a network outage, fraud, identity theft, and 
industrial espionage. There is also the cost of loss of reputation and goodwill, which can 
erode a person’s or company’s base in the long run. For example, a malicious individual 
can get access to credit card information that an online vendor obtains from customers. 
Once the customers find out that their credit information has been compromised, they 
will not want to do anymore business with that vendor because the site is considered 
insecure. More directly, an attacker could initiate lawsuits against the company that will 
lower the target’s reputation and turn away clientele. Security experts propose that as our 
culture becomes more dependent on information, social engineering will remain the 
greatest threat to any security system. 
Many companies conduct safety courses and testing in order to ensure their 
employees are working safely and responsibly, however few companies take that same 
stance with information security. They neglect to remind employees about the ways 
"information theft" is conducted. Social engineering is an underestimated security risk 
rarely addressed in employee training programs or corporate security policies. 
(McDermott, 2005) 
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C. PURPOSE OF STUDY  
Over the past few years of operational assessments of information assurance and 
interoperability, social engineering and close-access techniques have proved particularly 
effective at allowing Red Team and Opposing Force personnel to gain access to sensitive 
and secure areas, often in spite of doctrinally sound Force Protection Plans.  Previous 
assessment showed that current tactics, techniques, and procedures with their associated 
training do not adequately address the social engineering and close-access threats. This 
research assessment will examine social engineering and close-access techniques for 
elements that may lead to “pattern recognition” or improved probabilities of detection.  It 
will try to provide guidelines for policymakers in fighting the threats. 
Policymakers and management, alike, must understand the importance of 
developing and implementing well-rounded security policies and procedures. They must 
understand that all amounts of money spent on software patches, security hardware 
upgrade, and audits will be useless without adequate prevention of social engineering 
attacks.  Having clear-cut policies to counter social engineering attacks alleviates the 
employee’s responsibility to make judgment calls regarding an attacker's requests. 
Simply, if the solicited deed is prohibited by written policy, a target employee is bound 
by company rules to deny the attacker's request. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF PAPER  
This thesis contains six chapters.  Chapter II gives the background information to 
properly understand how social engineering works and describes its various forms.  
Chapter III discusses other work in the area that attempts to solve the problem. Chapter 
IV will propose our social engineering taxonomy, its trust and attack models, and how 
each model can be used for social engineering prevention. Chapter V will present our 
social-engineering encoding scheme and use it to analyze the cases presented in 
Mitnick’s “The Art of Deception.” Chapter VI concludes by summarizing the key issues 
and conclusions drawn in this thesis and postulates areas for future work. 
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II. BACKGROUND  
In this chapter, the first section gives an outline of social engineering and its 
categories. The next section provides an in-depth review of close-access techniques used 
to obtain trust via human face-to-face interaction.  The next section considers technology-
based techniques.  The last section discusses intelligence-gathering methods independent 
of human or technology focus. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Kevin Mitnick, a notorious social engineer, sums it up nicely, “You could spend a 
fortune purchasing technology and services...and your network infrastructure could still 
remain vulnerable to old-fashioned manipulation.” The focus of security is trust in 
protection and authenticity.  Why is the weakest link in the security chain between the 
keyboard and chair?  The natural human willingness to accept someone at his or her word 
leaves us vulnerable to intrusions of a social engineer.   
The fundamental goals of social engineering are the same as computer hacking: to 
gain unauthorized access to systems or information in order to commit fraud, network 
intrusion, industrial espionage, identity theft, or simply to disrupt the system or network. 
The key to social engineering is knowing the jargon, the corporate infrastructure, and 
human nature.  A good attacker exudes such confidence that few challenge him or his 
requests for seemingly, innocuous information.  Typical targets include big-name 
corporations and financial institutions, military and government agencies, and 
infrastructure providers (hardware, software, communication, voice mail vendors). The 
Internet boom had its share of industrial engineering attacks in start-up companies, but 
attacks generally focus on larger entities with high-valued assets (Granger, 2001). 
Even though any social engineering involves exploiting someone’s trust, there are 
two main categories: a human-based approach and a computer or technology-based 
approach.  The human-based approach is done through face-to-face communications, by 
taking advantage of the victim’s ignorance and the natural human inclination to be 
helpful and liked.  The technology-based approach deceives the user through electronic 
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communication.  We will call the human-based approach the close-access technique, and 
the technology-based approach, social engineering. 
Besides these two categories are two common methods of obtaining confidential 
information that are not centered on technology or face-to-face interaction:  open-source 
research and covert searches  or "dumpster diving”.  Although collecting open-source 
information on the Internet uses technology, this method does not require human 
manipulation. 
B. CLOSE-ACCESS TECHNIQUES 
Many organizations only plan for attacks directly against physical or technical 
resources and ignore the threat from attacks via human resources.  Close-access 
techniques use face-to-face manipulation to gain physical access to computer systems 
and, ultimately, the information contained in them.  We are referring to the manner in 
which the attack is carried out, emphasizing how to create the perfect psychological 
environment for the attack.   
Typically, successful social engineers have great people skills.  The main 
objective is to convince the target, a person knowing some valuable information, that the 
attacker is a trusted person that has a need to know.  Often an attacker exploits people’s 
ignorance of the value of the information they possess and their carelessness about 
protecting this seemingly innocuous data.  These close-access techniques from (Granger, 
2001) include: friendliness, impersonation, conformity, decoying, diffusion of 
responsibility, and reverse social engineering.  Reciprocity, consistency, and scarcity are 
proposed in (Cialdini, 2001).  In addition, our research adds sympathy, guilt, 
equivocation, ignorance, and affiliation to the set of trust ploys used to gain access and 
information.  
1. Friendliness 
A fundamental close-access technique to obtain information is just to be friendly. 
Because people tend to comply readily with individuals they know and like, any social 
engineer is most effective emphasizing factors that increase their overall attractiveness 
and likeability.  The average user wants to believe their colleagues and wants to help, so 
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the attacker really only needs to be cordial and convincing. Beyond that, most employees 
respond in kind, especially to women. Often times, slight flattery or flirtation might even 
help soften up the target employee to co-operate further.  A smile or a simple “thank you” 
usually seals the deal. 
2. Impersonation 
Impersonation means creating a character and playing out the role to deceive 
others and gain some advantage. The simpler the role, the better. Sometimes this could 
mean just calling someone up and saying: “Hi, I’m Bob in Information Technology (IT), 
and I need your password.”  Other times, the attacker will study a real individual in an 
organization and wait until that person is out of town to impersonate him over the phone 
or even in person. Industrious attackers with a high-valued target may even use an 
electronic device to disguise their voices and study speech patterns and organizational 
charts. Common roles impersonated include a repairman, an IT support person, a 
manager, a trusted third party, and a fellow employee. For example, someone alleging to 
be the CEO’s secretary calls to say that the CEO okayed her requesting certain 
information.  In a big organization, this is not that hard to do. It is difficult to know 
everyone, and IDs and entrance badges are easy to fake with the right tools.   
We will not use impersonation as a specific attack toolkit item since it seems to be 
used in most close-access/social engineering attacks, with an attacker pretending to be 
someone or something, such as a legitimate website, to exploit the target’s trust. 
3. Conformity 
Conformity is the tendency to see an action as appropriate when others are doing 
it.  This close-access technique, also known as social proof, can be used to convince a 
target to give out information by informing him that other associates are or have been 
complying with the same request.  When people are uncertain, they are more likely to use 
other’s actions to decide how they themselves should act, especially if the compared 
individual or group is similar to the target. 
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4. Diffusion of Responsibility  
When individuals believe that many others are present or have done a similar act, 
they as individuals do not bear the full burden of responsibility.  When a social engineer 
attacks in such a way as to seemingly diffuse the responsibility of the employee giving 
the password away, it alleviates the stress on the employee and makes it easier for them 
to comply.  
5. Decoys 
We are human and are limited in what we can focus our attention on at any 
moment.  A social engineer can exploit this limitation by decoys or distractions to 
conceal what they are truly seeking.  If a target is diverted from their usual security focus, 
the attacker can obtain the illicit information more easily.  
6. Reverse Social Engineering 
A more advanced method of gaining information is when the attacker creates a 
persona such that employees will ask him or her for information rather than the other way 
around. This technique requires a great deal of preparation and research beforehand.  If 
researched, planned and executed well, reverse social-engineering attacks offers the 
attacker a safe way of obtaining valuable data from the target employees since the victim 
is initiating transactions.  The decision to comply to a reverse social-engineering sting is 
steered by the reciprocity rule.  This compels the target to repay, in kind, what the 
attacker has provided as a favor.   
The three phases of reverse social-engineering attacks are sabotage, advertising, 
and assisting (Nelson, 2001). For example, the attacker sabotages a network, causing a 
problem to arise. The attacker then advertises that he can fix the problem.  When the 
attacker comes to fix the problem, he requests certain bits of information from the target 
employees to get what he really came for. The victims may never know that the purported 
problem solver was a social engineer, because their network problem goes away. 
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8. Commitment and Consistency 
In seeking compliance, securing an initial commitment from a victim is key. 
People have a natural tendency to honor commitments. A savvy social engineer realizes 
that people are more willing to agree to further requests that are in keeping with prior 
commitments. 
9. Scarcity 
People assign more value to opportunities when they are less available.  In a 
social-engineering attack, a target can be pressured to give out information when he 
thinks help from normal channels is only available for a limited time, say before close of 
business. 
10. Authority 
Several impersonation roles fall under the category of someone with authority.  
Historically, we are socialized with a deep-seated sense of duty to authority, because such 
obedience constitutes correct conduct.  We readily attribute knowledge, wisdom, and 
power to authoritative figures, so an attacker portraying a set of these characteristics can 
be more convincing.  
11. Sympathy 
Sympathy is usually the sharing of unhappiness or suffering. Additionally, it 
implies concern, or a wish to alleviate negative feelings others are experiencing.  An 
attacker eliciting that he needs help can win over a target’s sympathy, by encouraging the 
target to let down his guard and offer the requested information. 
12. Guilt 
One definition of guilt is the feeling of obligation for not pleasing, not helping, or 
not placating another.  Additionally, it is the acceptance of responsibility for someone 
else's misfortune or problem because it is bothersome to see that someone suffers.  A sly 




This technique exploits a clear sentence, spoken or typed, that has two meanings.  
When the perceived meaning of individual words is different from that which is intended, 
either the whole sentence is given new meaning or it loses meaning.  An equivocal 
statement or question starts out sounding reasonable and gets the target to agree to certain 
ideas or request by deliberately attempting to create uncertainty or ambiguity. After that, 
the meanings of key terms are changed, thus causing the victim to agree to things they 
would have never accepted at the beginning. 
14. Ignorance 
Pretending to be uninformed to manipulate a victim to give information is another 
popular close-access technique.  A common example is the impersonation of a new 
company or departmental employee who does not know the processes of the new 
environment. 
15. Affiliation 
Some attackers use name dropping to establish credibility, to proclaim association 
with collective organizations, or suggest being in the inner circle of acceptance.  This 
self-promotion reduces the target’s suspicion of the attacker motives. 
C. ONLINE SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
While the art of social engineering may have been mastered before the invention 
of technology and computers, the Internet is a fertile ground for social engineers looking 
to gather valuable information.  With the proliferation of poorly-secured computers on 
the Internet and publicly known security holes, the majority of security compromises are 
done by exploiting vulnerable computers.  Computer attacks that do not use social 
engineering is commonly termed hacking.  This is a more direct attack using hardware 
and software methods and programming tricks to break a security feature on the system 
itself.  Generally, hacking requires above-average computer skills and takes much longer 
than simply obtaining an authorized user’s ID and password. 
Social engineering for online information often focuses on obtaining passwords. 
While the typical social engineering attempt would be to gain trust and just ask for the 
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password, many technical methods can also be used to gain password information 
without the owner’s permission. An ongoing weakness that makes these attacks 
successful is that many users often repeat the use of one simple password on every 
Internet account, even their financial institutions.  Several methods can gain password 
information.  
1. Awards 
Another way in which attackers can obtain personal information is through online 
forms that solicit information: Attackers can send out enticing offers or “awards” and ask 
the user to enter their name, e-mail address, and even account passwords. 
2. Pop-up Windows 
Pop-up windows can be installed by attackers to look like part of the network and 
request that the user reenter his username and password to fix some sort of problem. 
3. Network Sniffing 
Sniffing means examining network traffic for passwords. A person doing sniffing 
generally gains the confidence of someone who has authorized access to the network, to 
help reveal information that compromises that networks security.  Then, the attacker can 
monitor a screen until an unsuspecting target types in their account information. 
4. Email 
Email can be used for more direct means of gaining access to a system. For 
instance, mail attachments can carry malicious software that can gather personal 
information without the user knowing.  Trojan horses, viruses, and worms can be slipped 
into the e-mail body or attachments to solicit usernames and passwords. 
5. Phishing 
Phishing is a form of social engineering which involves using e-mail and websites 
designed to look like those of well-known legitimate businesses, financial institutions, 
and government agencies, to deceive users into disclosing their account information.  
These phony websites are simulations that appear to be login screens, but are not.  
Graphics and format can be copied from legitimate sites to make them highly convincing.   
  12
Once trust is established, a phisher tries to obtain sensitive personal, financial, 
corporate or network information.  Many attackers target financial or retail organizations, 
but military targets are increasing (especially highly targeted phishing called "spear 
phishing").  Phishing can try to lure consumers into revealing their personal and financial 
data such as social-security numbers, bank and credit-card account information, and 
details of online accounts and passwords.  A spoofed e-mail could ask you for billing 
information or other personal records, supposedly from a high-ranking employee.  The 
attacker could e-mail thousands of online customers as the head of a corporation asking 
them to send in their passwords because some files were lost. Phishing can also be very 
useful to an state-level adversary for spying or sabotage. 
6. Harvesting Networks 
Another tactic of social engineering is to use social-network websites such as 
myspace.com and friendster.com to harvest freely available personal data about 
participants, and then use the data in scams such as fraud and money laundering. 
D. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
1. Open-Source Research 
Much historical and background information can be obtained before even talking 
to any person by simply surfing target web sites and looking up the target on search 
engines such as Google. For businesses, employee e-mail addresses and phone numbers, 
organizational charts, executive titles, and financial information are often publicly 
available.  Some even have pictures of executives on their website, along with their 
phone number and e-mail address.  
2. Dumpster Diving 
Dumpster diving, also known as trashing, is another popular method of collecting 
information without interfacing with people or technology. A huge amount of 
information can be collected through company or individual dumpsters. Potential security 
leaks in our trash include “phone books, organizational charts, memos, policy manuals, 
calendars of meetings, events and vacations, system manuals, printouts of sensitive data 
or login names and passwords, printouts of source code, disks and tapes, company 
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letterhead and memo forms, and outdated hardware” (Granger, 2001). Phone books can 
give the attackers names and numbers of people to target and impersonate. 
Organizational charts contain information about people who are in positions of authority 
within the organization. Memos provide small tidbits of useful information for faking 
authenticity. Policy manuals show attackers how secure (or insecure) the company really 
is. Calendars may tell attackers which employees are out of town at a particular time. 
System manuals, sensitive data, and other sources of technical information may give 
attackers the exact keys they need to unlock the network. Outdated hardware, particularly 
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III. PREVIOUS MODELS OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
Social engineering, obtaining information by human trust manipulation, has been 
used for centuries, but there is little formalized theory in this area.  The closest research 
work associated is found in the area of trust.  The first section provides a detailed 
assessment of the essential role that trust plays in a successful social engineering ploy and 
recognizes previous trust models.  The second section discusses the current prevention 
recommendations from computer security and social engineering experts. 
A. TRUST 
Social engineering uses human error and weakness to gain access to a system 
despite the layers of defensive security controls that have been implemented via physical 
safeguards, hardware, and software. Since a crucial objective is to convince the person 
disclosing the information that the attacker is a trusted person that has a need to know, 
trust is an important topic to cover to fully understand a social engineer. 
Trust is subjective; there may always be hidden factors, intentional or 
subconsciously, behind a decision to trust or not. To deal with the immense data 
processing of everyday life, we must use shortcuts to sort through all the information and 
make judgments accordingly.  “Quite a lot of laboratory research had shown that people 
are more likely to deal with information in a controlled fashion when they have both the 
desire and the ability to analyze it carefully; otherwise, they are likely to use the easier 
click, whirr approach” (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Wegener, 1999).  This click, 
whirr approach is characterized by fixed-action patterns where a set of behaviors occurs 
in the same fashion and in the identical order, as if these patterns are recorded on tapes.  
“Click and the appropriate tape is activated; whirr and out rolls the standard sequence of 
behaviors” (Cialdini, 2001). When we are rushed, stressed, uncertain, indifferent, 
distracted, or fatigued, we tend to resort to shortcuts rather than extensive analysis.  As a 
result, “much of the compliance process (wherein one person is spurred to comply with 
another person’s request) can be understood in terms of a human tendency for automatic, 
shortcut responding” (Sztompka, 1999), making us vulnerable to trust manipulation. 
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1. Trust Definitions 
Previous research on trust does not clearly differentiate among factors that 
contribute to trust, trust itself, and outcomes of trust (Cook & Wall, 1980; Kee & Knox, 
1970). We will focus on the relationship between two parties, not necessarily two 
individuals, and the reasons why a trustor (trusting party) would trust a trustee (party to 
be trusted).  The act of trust may start out as a unilateral expectation and commitment, but 
the trusting results in a relationship.  To understand the extent to which a person is 
willing to trust another person, three crucial areas must be examined: 
1. the trustor’s propensity to trust; 
2. the trustor’s perception of the trustee’s benevolence, reputation, performance, 
and appearance; and 
3. the environment circumstances. 
a. Relationship 
According to Sztompka, trust is a bet about the future contingent actions 
of others.  Trust results from the idea of individual freedom; one person does not have 
direct control over others.  In general, people have choices and are not confined to 
another person’s dictates.  The more available options people face, the less predictable 
are the decisions they take.  But relationships between people limit the options to those 
acceptable to others..   
b. Trustor 
Trust liberates and mobilizes human agency, and releases creative, 
uninhibited, innovative, entrepreneurial activisms toward other people (Luhmann, 1979).   
Traits of the trustor will determine how easily that individual will trust another party.  
This measure of a person’s willingness to trust is known as propensity to trust.  The 
crucial problem for the trustor is the lack of sufficient information on all relevant aspects 
of the situation.  Since the estimate of the potential gain or loss is not easily predicted, 
risk comes into play.  This risk-taking opens the door for a social engineer to exploit. 
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c. Trustee 
An attacker must appear trustworthy to the target victim, the trustor.  We 
recognize four factors (Sztompka, 1999 & Mayer, 1995) that affect an attacker’s 
perceived trustworthiness: benevolence, reputation, performance, and appearance. 
Trustworthiness correlates with the motivation, or lack of, to lie.  Benevolence signifies 
this motivation of the trustee toward the trustor, i.e. good or bad intentions.  Reputation 
refers to past deeds such as affiliation.  Performance refers to present conduct such as the 
trustee’s current position or job title.  Appearance refers to external features, dress, 
actions, and worldly possessions (or lack of).  Last but not least, environment is discussed 
in the next section at length because it is not an internal characteristic of the trustee. The 
higher the trustee’s benevolence, reputation, performance, and appearance, the more 
likely the trustor would comply to a request of the trustee, the social engineer. 
d. Environment 
In the arena of social engineering and trust building, the situational 
circumstance plays a vital role in how the attacker convinces the trustor of his 
trustworthiness.  This circumstance includes the level of information asked for, the 
knowledge of its value, and the state of mind of the trustor.   “The trustor’s perception 
and interpretation of the context of the relationship will affect both the need for trust and 
the evaluation of trustworthiness” (Mayer, 1995). This adaptability of an attacker’s 
tactics is what makes a social engineering attack dynamic, making prevention methods 
harder.  
e. Risk 
Risk, or having something vested in an outcome, is a requisite to trust 
(Deutsch, 1958). “A specific quality of exchange involving trust is the presence of basic 
uncertainty or risk.” (Sztompka, 1999)  Trust is inversely proportional to the perceived 
uncertainty or risk involved.  As our trust in an attacker increases, the risk they pose to us 
decreases, making us more prone to comply with their wishes.  An example of this 
inverse relationship often occurs in situations involving female social engineers because 
society perceives women to be less harmful, i.e. less risky, than men. 
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f. Culture  
Our globalizing society fosters interdependence so people must depend on 
others, sometimes strangers, in various ways to accomplish their personal and 
professional goals.  Due to massive migrations, tourism, and travel we encounter and are 
surrounded by much diversity.  Trust encourages tolerance, acceptance of strangers and 
recognizes differences as acceptable.  Additionally, trust is a good strategy to deal with 
the anonymity and complexity of institutions, organizations, technological systems, and 
the increasingly global scope of their operations.  The need for trust grows as networks 
become more complex (Luhmann, 1979).  Trust is culturally functional because it 
encourages sociability, participation, and fosters a feeling of order and security.   
g. Internet  
Social engineering capitalizes on people's inability to keep up with a 
culture that relies heavily on information technology. Online transactions including 
banking and shopping eliminate direct human contact.  The businesses realize that there 
is no e-business without trust.  This proportional relationship between trust and 
information-sharing brings another point to why we are becoming increasingly prone to 
social engineering attacks.   
Our modern era, often termed The Information Age, has never been called 
The Knowledge Age.  Information does not translate directly into 
knowledge.  It must first be processed-accessed, absorbed, comprehended, 
integrated, and retained (Sztompka, 1999). 
As a result, the shortcut measures of trust (benevolence, appearance, performance, 
reputation, and situation) are increasingly more vulnerable to exploitation.  
2. Previous Trust Models 
a. An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust 
(Mayer, 1995) proposes that trust is the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will 
perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor 
or control that other party.  Their model incorporates the dynamic nature of trust with the 
feedback loop from the “Outcomes” to the perceived characteristics of the trustee.  The 
  19
outcome of the trusting behavior will influence trust indirectly through the perceptions of 
ability, benevolence, and integrity at the next interaction. 
 
Figure 2.   Integrative Model of Organizational Trust (From Mayer, 1995) 
 
In Figure 2, the model explicitly considers both characteristics of the 
trustee as well as the trustor.  It differentiates trust from its outcome of risk-taking in the 
relationship.  Additionally, this model distinguishes between factors that cause trust and 
trust itself.  They recognize that there is a need to measure the willingness to be 
vulnerable because trust is this willingness.  As a result, this model illuminates that the 
level of trust of one individual for another and the level of perceived risk in a situation 
will lead to risk taking in the relationship. 
b. Trust in Virtual Teams: Towards an Integrative Model of Trust 
Formation 
The model from (Hung, 2004) examines the three possible routes to trust: 
the peripheral route, the central route, and the habitual route.  In Figure 3, the three routes 
to trust represent the gradual shift of bases for trust formation over time as one gains 
personal experience and knowledge of the involved parties. While prior models 
describing different forms of trust emphasize trust observed at different points in time, 
this model integrates the different forms of trust and focuses on the dynamic shifts of 
trust over time by using a fundamental theoretical framework. 
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Figure 3.   Trust Formation in Virtual Teams (From Hung, 2004) 
 
c. A Distributed Trust Model 
 In another model, (Abdul-Rahman, 1997) highlights the need for effective 
trust management in distributed systems, and proposes a distributed trust model based on 
recommendations.  A Recommendation is a communicated trust information which 
contains reputation information.  Each agent stores reputation records in its own private 
database and uses this information to make recommendations to other agents. They 
define trust as “a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent will 
perform a particular action, both before [we] can monitor such action (or independently 
of his capacity of ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects [our] 
own action” (Gambetta, 1990).  Their four goals were:  
1. To adopt a decentralized approach to trust management. 
2. To generalize the notion of trust. 
3. To reduce ambiguity by using explicit trust statements. 
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4. To facilitate the exchange of trust-related information via a 
recommendation protocol. 
B. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURES 
Since social engineering is an attacker’s manipulation of the natural human 
tendency to trust, prevention requires education and constant vigilance.  Even though the 
threat is common, it is possible to keep morale high and have a mostly-trusting 
organization culture without sacrificing security. There are existing prevention methods 
and countermeasures that can be incorporated into day-to-day business.  By slightly 
changing the rules of the daily operations and having organization-wide buy-in of its 
importance, social engineering attacks can be made far less often successful.  
1. Admittance  
Prevention starts with problem realization and is dependent on educating people 
about the value of information, training them to protect it, and increasing people's 
awareness of how social engineers operate. The importance of training employees 
extends beyond the Help Desk, across the entire organization.  Most users should know 
not to send passwords in clear text (if at all), but occasional reminders of this simple 
security measure from the System Administrator is essential. System administrators 
should warn their users against disclosing any account or personal information in any 
fashion other than a face-to-face conversation with a staff member who is known to be 
authorized and trusted (Granger, 2001). 
2. Recognition  
To foil an attack, it helps to recognize a social engineering ploy. “Look for things 
that don’t quite add up.” (Granger, 2002)  Several signs that you are dealing with a social 
engineer:  
a) refusal to give contact information;  
b) rushing; 
c) name-dropping;  
d) intimidation; 
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e) small mistakes (misspellings, misnomers, odd questions); and  
f) requesting forbidden information.  
3. Contingency Planning  
In the event that an employee detects something suspicious, he or she needs to 
follow procedures in place for reporting the incident. It is important for one person to be 
responsible for tracking these incidents.  Also, that employee should notify others who 
serve in similar positions as they may be threatened as well (Granger, 2002). 
4. Proactive Security 
Avoiding the social-engineering threat requires organizations to become more 
security-centric, or ensure they have a strong information security policy.  The following 
suggestions are commonly made:.  
a) Conduct ongoing in-depth information-security training.  
b) Be suspicious of unsolicited e-mail messages, phone calls, or visits from 
individuals asking about employees or other internal information. If 
dealing with an unknown person claiming to be from a legitimate 
organization, verify their identity directly with the organization..  
c) Never be afraid to question the credentials of someone claiming to work 
for your organization.  
d) Install and maintain firewalls, anti-virus software, anti-spyware software, 
and e-mail filters.  
e) Pay attention to the URL of a web site. Malicious web sites generally look 
identical to a legitimate site, but the URL may use a variation in spelling 
or a different domain.  
f) Don't send sensitive information over the Internet before checking a 
website’s security.  
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g) Don't reveal personal or financial information in e-mail, and do not 
respond to e-mail solicitations requesting this information. This includes 
following links sent in e-mail.  
h) Don't provide personal information or information about your organization 
to anyone, including the structure of your networks, unless you are certain 
of a person’s authority to have that information.  
i) Be careful about what is provided on your organization's web site. Avoid 
posting organizational charts or lists of key people like officers.  
j) Shred any document that is discarded that may contain sensitive data.  
k) Don't allow employees to download from anywhere (McDermott, 2005). 
C. SUMMARY  
Because of technological advances, information available to people is burgeoning, 
choices are increasing, and knowledge is exploding.  These factors often make careful 
assessment of all information-access situations impractical.  The feeling of familiarity 
breeds trust, providing the feeling of security, certainty, predictability, and comfort.  
Personnel often turn to a shortcut approach to make compliance decisions, using a single 
(typically reliable) piece of information.  The most reliable and therefore, most popular 
such single triggers are the close access techniques described in Chapter II.  Social 
engineers that infuse their requests with one or more of these techniques are more likely 
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IV. A MODEL OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Social engineering attacks can be very dynamic and often vary widely depending 
on the attacker, target information, victim, and environmental circumstances.   
 [A] group of strangers walked into a large shipping firm and walked out 
with access to the firm’s entire corporate network. [They] obtain[ed] small 
amounts of access, bit by bit, from a number of different employees. First, 
they did research about the company for two days before even attempting 
to set foot on the premises (Granger, 2001) 
By asking the right questions, the attackers pieced together enough information to aid in 
their infiltration of an organization’s network. If an attacker were not able to gather 
enough information from one source, they would contact another source within the same 
organization and rely on the information from the first source to add to their appearance 
of credibility.  This continues until the attackers have enough in their toolkit to access the 
network and obtain the targeted data. 
We propose two models, a trust model and an attack model, for what a social 
engineer does before, during, and after an attack.   The attack model is recursive because 
typical attacks require more than one looping of the steps to achieve the end goal.  The 
attack model can call on the trust model to provide the attacker another conquered 
information source, direct or indirect. 
B. TRUST MODEL 
As shown in Figure 4, our Trust Model describes how a social engineer 
establishes a trustworthy relationship with a person that has needed information for a 
social engineering attack.  Initially, an attacker obtains background information (freely 
available if possible) about the target.  A key early stage in the trust process is the 
receiver’s (victim’s) judgment of the credibility of the information provided by the 
attacker.  From Chapter III, three prevalent areas stand out that explain trust: 
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1. the trustor’s propensity to trust;  
2. the trustor’s perception of the trustee’s benevolence, reputation, 
performance, and appearance; and 
3. the environmental circumstances. 
Detailed explanations of these three areas are given in Chapter III, A. I. Trust Definitions.  
Traits of the trustor will determine how easily that individual will trust another party.  
This is known as propensity to trust.  The surrounding environment  plays a vital role in 
convincing the trustor that the attacker is trustworthy.  Environmental factors include the 
level of information being requested, the trustor’s knowledge of it’s value, and the 
trustor’s state of mind.  
Trustworthiness correlates with the motivation, or lack of, to lie.  We recognize 
four factors (Sztompka, 1999 & Mayer, 1995) that affect an attacker’s perceived 
trustworthiness: benevolence, reputation, performance, and appearance. Benevolence 
signifies this motivation of the trustee toward the trustor, i.e. good or bad intentions.  
Reputation refers to past deeds and affiliations.  Performance refers to present conduct 
such as the trustee’s current position or job title.  Appearance refers to external features, 
dress, actions, and worldly possessions (or lack thereof).  Source (trustee or receiver), 
trustor, and the circumstances surrounding the attack all interact in the assessment of 
trusting.  Presenting some combination of these character traits and manipulating the 




















Figure 4.   Social-Engineering Trust Model 
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C. ATTACK MODEL 
Our Attack Model illustrates how a single typical information-gathering attack is 
carried out to obtain a single item of information, a kind of "subroutine" for a class of 
social-engineering ploys.  Here the connections between nodes represent actions.  Trust 
of a victim by an attacker is usually developed with the methods of the Trust Model as a 
precondition to most of the steps of the Attack Model.  The model begins when the social 
engineer undertakes some research on the target individual or organization. The 
information gained, even if not helpful, may be used to obtain further information that 
might be helpful.  Then the attacker uses one of a number of techniques to achieve their 
objective.  
In Figure 5, there are four main categories of attack techniques. They are 
deception, causing to believe what is not true; influence, to sway or affect based on 
prestige, wealth, ability, or position; persuasion, to induce to undertake a course of action 
by means of argument, reasoning, or entreaty; and manipulation, to falsify for malicious 
gain.  The toolkit of a social engineering attack includes the tactics of friendliness, 
conformity, decoying, diffusion of responsibility, reverse social engineering, consistency, 
scarcity, sympathy, guilt, equivocation, ignorance, and affiliation.  Using some 
combination of these trust ploys to achieve one or more of these attack techniques, the 
social engineer tries to gain unauthorized access to systems or information.  The intent is 
usually to commit a crime such as fraud, espionage, identity theft, or vandalism of a 
system or network.  Depending on the size and other characteristics of the target 
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V. TAXONOMY APPLIED TO MITNICK’S EXAMPLES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
We can use the models given in Chapter IV, plus the taxonomies discussed in 
Chapters II and III, to better characterize the anecdotes of social-engineering attacks 
given in (Mitnick, 2002).  Assessing an attack with this encoding will enable us to 
pinpoint areas of improvement or focus our attention on the most vulnerable spots that a 
social engineer relies on.  
B. OUR TAXONOMY FOR ENCODING SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
ATTACKS 
We propose four main dimensions of interest in determining the type and severity 
of a social engineering attack.  Our goal is to find the holes and propose countermeasures 
or prevention techniques.  The first category is the Target of interest:   
a) Finance (banks, credit card vendors, credit agencies) 
b) Commercial 
c) Government 
d) Infrastructure provider (hardware, software, communications) 
e) Infrastructure 
The second category is the Type of Deception from the associated semantic case or set of 
cases in (Rowe, 2006): 
Space:  
1) Direction, of the action  
2) Location-at, where something occurred  
3) Location-from, where something started  
4) Location-to, where something finished  
5) Location-through, where some action passed through  
6) Orientation, in some space  
Time: 
7) Frequency, of occurrence of a repeated action  
8) Time-at, time at which something occurred  
9) Time-from, time at which something started  
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10) Time-to, time at which something ended  
11) Time-through, time through which something  
Participant  
12) Agent, who initiates the action  
13) Beneficiary, who benefits  
14) Experiencer, who senses the action 
15) Instrument, what helps accomplish the action   
16) Object, what the action is done to 
17) Recipient, who receives the action  
Causality: 
18) Cause  
19) Contradiction, what this action opposes if anything  
20) Effect  
21) Purpose 
Quality: 
22) Accompaniment, an additional object associated with the action  
23) Content, what is contained by the action object  
24) Manner, the way in which the action is done  
25) Material, the atomic units out of which the action is composed 
26) Measure, the measurement associated with the action 
27) Order, with respect to other actions  
28) Value, the data transmitted by the action (the software sense of the term) 
Essence: 
29) Supertype, a generalization of the action type  
30) Whole, of which the action is a part 
Speech-act theory: 
31) External precondition on the action – inserting precondition when non-existent 
32) Internal precondition, on the ability of the agent to perform the action – new hire 
employee 
The third category is the particular Resource or Target Information: 
A) Identification – password/internal code, username, employee #/ID 
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B) Affiliation status - entrance badge, other company employees 
C) Internal information – contact information, authority name(s), account 
information, process information, work schedule, organizational chart, company 
directory, hardware/software/application information, access procedure 
D) Data/product movement/change/software install/hardware install 
E) Trust 
The fourth category is the Trust Ploy taken from Chapter II: 





vi) Conformity  
vii) Sympathy 
viii) Guilt 





C. ENCODING OF THE MITNICK ANECDOTES 
(Mitnick, 2002) is a classic summary of social-engineering techniques, but its 
anecdotal nature makes it hard to infer principles of social engineering from it.  So we 
encoded each of the anecdotes using our taxonomy, described in the previous section, in 
order to better see patterns.  As an example, we will encode the Swiss Bank Anecdote 
using the four main dimensions of interest in determining the type of social engineering 
attack. 
1) Swiss Bank Account, pg 4: target – a 
a) Obtain daily code: 21Ax,xii 
b) Request transfer: 12Dvi 
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Since the goal was to get $10, 200, 000 wired to a Swiss bank account, the Target 
dimension is encoded as (a) for Finance.  There are two information-gathering objectives 
required for the end-goal to be achieved.  First, the social engineer needs to obtain the 
daily code to authorize the wire transfer.  To obtain the code, the attacker impersonated 
an IT staff member who needed to look at the operating procedures for the back-up 
system of the wire room.  This is entails deception of Purpose, (21) in our encoding.  The 
(A) signifies that the Target Information was Identification.  The Trust Ploys used in this 
objective were Decoying, distracting the employees in the wire room with his deceptive 
purpose, (x), and Ignorance, exploiting the employee’s thinking that the daily codes are 
unimportant in that they were posted out in the open, (xii). 
Second, the social engineer must request the wire transfer of money.  The social 
engineer used deception of Agent, (12), because he represented himself to the bank 
representative as an employee in the bank’s International Department.  The Target 
Information in this objective was the movement of money, electronically which we 
encoded as (D).  The Trust Ploy that the social engineer exploited in this attack is 
Conformity in that the bank representative simply did what she thought was regular daily 
operations, (vi). 
Below are the encodings for the rest of the Mitnick examples.   
2) Creditchex, pg 16: Creditchex concerns a private investigator’s obtaining credit 
information of a husband that left his wife, taking all their savings.  
Target: a 
a) Get industry terminology: 21Eiv,xii 
b) Obtain current merchant ID: 21Cx,xii 
3) Engineer Trap, pg 22:  Engineer Trap explains how an employment agency seeks out 
qualified, already employed electrical engineers for a start-up company. 
Target: b 
a) Get Accounts Receivable contact #: 21Cii,iv,xii 
b) Get cost center #:  21Cii,iv,x,xii 
c) Get dept to call for directory: 12Biv,vii,x,xii 




4) Obtain employee #, pg 26:  This anecdote describes how to obtain a valid employee 
number by claiming a clerical error exists.  (d12Aiv,x,xii) 
5) Obtain unlisted contact #, pg 31: To obtain a non-published number, simply pose as 
an overworked fellow employee needing a little help to accomplish a heavy-duty 
assignment in the field. (d12Civ,vii,x,xii) 
6) State talk to FBI database, pg 33: This illustrates how a social engineer finds out if 
the state department communicates with the FBI for hiring. (c12Cx) 
7) Obtain Test Number Directory, pg 35: The story tells how one would go about 
obtaining a prized directory listing telephone numbers used by phone technicians. 
(d21Cix,xii) 
8) Obtain customer information, pg 36: To obtain personal information on a customer of 
a gas company, simply pose as a co-worker without computer access due to a 
malicious software attack. (d21Cii,iv,vii,xii) 
9) Video Store, pg 42: This illustrates how easy it is for a social engineer to obtain your 
credit card information from a video store over the telephone.  
TargetT – a 
a) Get store manager info: 21Biv,vi,xii 
b) Obtain credit card info: 12Cii,iii,iv,vi,vii 
10) Calling plan, pg 48: This story explains how an attacker obtained a free cell phone 
from a store representative.  
Target - b 
a) Get employee schedule: 21Biv,vi 
b) Obtain phone for free: 12Ciii,iv,vi,vii 
11) Network Outage, pg 55: This example of reverse engineering shows the steps for 
making a victim ask the attacker for IT help. 
Target – e 
a) Get port #: 12Ci,iii,iv,vi 
b) Cause network outage: 21Eiii,vi 
c) Requests help from target: 18Ei,iii,vi 
d) Download malware: 18Diii,ix 
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12) Who’s new, pg 61: This anecdote describes the simple steps to obtain the names of 
new employees. (d21Ciii,iv,vi)  
13) Obtain password, pg 62: This encoding illustrates how a social engineer poses as a 
helpful IT staff member to gather authentication credentials from unsuspecting users. 
(e21Ai,iii,iv,vi) 
14) Proprietary information, pg 65: Some attacks are more involved than others.  This 
anecdote discusses the steps taken to get an account with privileged access. 
Target - e 
a) Get associated people’s info: 21Biv,vi,xii 
b) Get computer system’s name: 12Ciii,vi,xii 
c) Obtain names and e-mails faxed: 21Ciii,vi,xii 
d) Get external dial up #: 12Cvi,vii 
e) Get a password from UNIX’s hashed file: n/a 
f) Obtain authorized username and password: 21Ai,iii,v,vi,vii,viii,x 
The next two social engineering attacks, 15 and 16, describe  how to gain access to anan 
organization’s internal network. 
15) WAN access, pg 77: target – d 
a) Get employee name from receptionist: 22Axii 
b) Get employee number: 18Ax 
c) Obtain dial up access: 12C “asked for it” 
16) Encryption software, pg 85: target – d 
a) Get Secure ID token access: 12Aix,xiii 
b) Get servers’ names:  12Cvi 
c) Obtain Telnet access: 12Cxiii 
17) Update account for $5, pg 97: Five dollars is a trivial amount, but this story shows 
how it can lure a user into giving away their personal account information. 
(a29Cx,xii,xiii) 
18) Getting on the A-list, pg 106: This illustrates how easy it is to obtain entrance 
credentials for a movie studio. (b32Biv,vii,xiii) 
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19) Getting cheating ex’s unlisted number, pg 108: Being female, friendly, and 
knowledgeable about industry “lingo” will get you many things, including an ex-
boyfriend’s unlisted telephone number. (d21Ciii,x) 
20) Need report yesterday, pg 111: This describes the affects of using authoritative 
intimidation to obtain a proprietary report. (e31Diii,xiii) 
21) Public servant in need, pg 112: This story shows that government systems can be 
attacked by exploiting sympathy and people’s willingness to help. (c18Bvii,xiii,iv) 
22) Lucky Monday, pg 117: This describes how a helpful social engineer gets an 
unsuspecting employee to change her password just long enough for him to get access 
using her account information. (e19Di,iii,iv,xiii) 
23) Am I wanted, pg 121: This story tells how a criminal finds out if there is a warrant 
out for his arrest. 
Target - c 
a) Get warrant: 21Cxiii,iii,vi,vii 
b) Reroute fax: 13Cxiii,vi,vii 
24) Stealing a degree, pg 125: Identity theft is shown in this story; the attacker steals 
personal information from a graduate that shares his name.  
Target - e 
a) Get server name: 12Ciii,xiii 
b) Get authorized username and password: 21Axii 
c) Get database procedure: 18Cvii,xiii 
D. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
For our summary statistics, we list the total counts of occurrences for each item.   
Target of interest:  Throughout (Mitnick, 2002), we assessed 24 targets of interests. 
a) Finance - 4 
b) Commercial - 3 
c) Government - 3 
d) Infrastructure provider - 8 
e) Infrastructure - 6 
Type of Deception:  Among the 24 targets of interest, there were 45 instances of 
deception steps that warrant labeling.  
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Space:  
1) Direction, of the action - 0 
2) Location-at, where something occurred - 0 
3) Location-from, where something started - 0 
4) Location-to, where something finished - 0 
5) Location-through, where some action passed through - 0 
6) Orientation, in some space - 0 
Time: 
7) Frequency, of occurrence of a repeated action - 0 
8) Time-at, time at which something occurred - 0 
9) Time-from, time at which something started - 0 
10) Time-to, time at which something ended - 0 
11) Time-through, time through which something - 0 
Participant  
12) Agent, who initiates the action - 15 
13) Beneficiary, who benefits - 1 
14) Experiencer, who senses the action - 0 
15) Instrument, what helps accomplish the action - 0 
16) Object, what the action is done to - 0 
17) Recipient, who receives the action - 0 
Causality: 
18) Cause - 5 
19) Contradiction, what this action opposes if anything - 1 
20) Effect - 0 
21) Purpose - 19 
Quality: 
22) Accompaniment, an additional object associated with the action - 1 
23) Content, what is contained by the action object - 0 
24) Manner, the way in which the action is done - 0 
25) Material, the atomic units out of which the action is composed - 0 
26) Measure, the measurement associated with the action - 0 
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27) Order, with respect to other actions - 0 
28) Value, the data transmitted by the action - 0 
Essence: 
29) Supertype, a generalization of the action type - 1 
30) Whole, of which the action is a part - 0 
Speech-act theory: 
31) External precondition on the action - 1 
32) Internal precondition - 1 
Resource or Target Information:  Each of the 45 instances of labeled deception steps are 
accompanied by corresponding target information.  
A) Identification - 8 
B) Affiliation status - 6 
C) Internal information - 23 
D) Data/product movement/change/software install/hardware install - 5 
E) Trust - 3 
Trust Ploy: Because each attack step can use any combination of close access techniques, 
each of the 45 instances of labeled deception steps are accompanied by various sets of 
trust ploys. 
i) Reverse social engineering - 5 
ii) Commitment/Consistency - 5 
iii) Authority - 15 
iv) Friendliness - 16 
v) Scarcity - 1 
vi) Conformity - 18 
vii) Sympathy - 12 
viii) Guilt - 1 
ix) Diffusion of Responsibility - 2 
x) Decoy - 12 
xi) Equivocation - 0 
xii) Ignorance - 17 
xiii) Affiliation - 11 
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E. COUNTERMEASURES FROM EXPERIMENT 
Within the Target category, the Infrastructure Provider was the most targeted 
institution.  This is only logical from a social-engineering standpoint because attackers 
need insider information; the bulk of an attack is gathering enough background 
information to be reputable.  Infrastructure providers often hold the key to intermediary 
access.  The key to attack prevention within these companies is awareness.  On-going, 
relevant education about social engineering vulnerabilities must be enforced as a critical 
company policy that is supported throughout—from CEO down to line employees.  More 
about this prevention method is presented in Chapter IV. 
Among the Types of Deception, deception of Agent and deception of Purpose are 
the most prevalent.  “Identification of participants responsible for actions (‘agents’) is a 
key problem in cyberspace, and is an easy target for deception.  Deception in…purpose… 
is important in many kinds of social-engineering attacks where false reasons like ‘I have 
a deadline’ or ‘It didn't work’ are given for requests for actions or information that aid the 
adversary (Rowe, 2006)”.  Since recognition is the first step to prevention, multimodal 
training must be implemented to help employees recognize a social engineer via an 
understanding of typical personae and the reasons commonly used to obtain illicit 
information from authorized users.  Multimodal training includes interactive computer 
case-studies, live acting of scenarios, picture(s) of phishing e-mails and phony websites, 
and audio clips of what a social engineer would sound like over the phone.  Similarly to 
how firefighters are trained for their life-saving jobs, employees must realize that a 
social-engineering attack can result in a fatality by leaking classified information about 
national security. 
In the Target Information category, attacks to gain Internal-Information are the 
most common.  Similar to how Infrastructure Providers are the center of attention among 
institutions; this class of information is most vulnerable to attack due to its value in 
fostering trust and reputation for a social engineer.   
Finally, Conformity and Ignorance are the traits most susceptible to a social–
engineering attack.  The natural human tendency to do as others do, combined with the 
notion that the information they possess is innocuous, can be dangerous when exploited 
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by an attacker seeking prohibited information.  Having policy ingrained into everyday 
operations will lessen the burden of targeted victims to make decisions when under attack 
by a preying social engineer.  Additionally, awareness and multimodal training may 
effectively counter Internal Information, Conformity, and Ignorance risks.  The key is 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
With our ever-increasing dependence on rapidly advancing technology, there is 
no single method that will fully protect against security threats, especially social-
engineering threats. It is harder to protect yourself against social engineering than against 
malicious software attacks.  Since social-engineering is not as predictable as a virus 
outbreak, it is important to always keep in mind that it can strike anybody at any time.  
Additionally, software has limited ways to execute while a social engineer can attack 
from many different angles. Fortunately, there are ways to reduce the possibility of 
successful social-engineering attacks. Defense-in-depth with constant vigilance and 
multimodal training, coupled with strong policy, will usually be the best defense strategy. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM EXPERIMENT 
We have presented a taxonomy that should be useful for modeling and assessing a 
social-engineering attack.  Based on the two models, Trust and Attack, we propose these 
actions to harden security in their specific areas. 
Given the Trust Model, initial prevention methods can be taken at the step where 
the Trustee Researches and Studies the Situation and Trustor.  An organization should be 
particularly careful about what is provided on the organization's or personnel’s websites.  
Posting organizational charts or lists of key personnel and computer administrators 
should be avoided. Also, any document that is discarded that may contain proprietary, 
sensitive, or personal data should be shredded.  
When the trustee’s trustworthiness is in question, i.e. an information requester that 
is slight suspicious, personnel should never provide personal information or information 
about the organization, including the structure of your networks, to anyone unless that 
person’s authority to have that information is verified.  Unsolicited e-mail messages, 
phone calls, or visits from individuals asking about employees or other internal 
information should be treated as suspicious. If dealing with an unknown person claiming 
to be from a legitimate organization, verify their identity directly with that organization. 
In the attack model, the steps represented with a circle are focus areas where 
preventive measures and awareness can lessen the chances for a successful social-
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engineering attack.  At Goal Researched, similar preventive steps to those mentioned 
above that will help keep information away from the attacker are recommended.  Before 
the implementation of the Trust Model to obtain needed trust from the victim, recognition 
tactics would help prevent would-be victims from believing deceptions so readily.  One 
tactic would be to focus on signs that the requester has harmful intentions, e.g. the refusal 
to give contact information, rushing, name-dropping, intimidation, requesting odd 
information, and uncommon flattery.  Additionally, security policy should somehow be 
automated so that the guesswork and decision-making responsibility is removed from the 
human victim.  To counter a social engineer from Technically Attacking the System or 
Network, encryption, intrusion-detection tools and auditing of account access will help 
prevent a hacker from gaining access or slow him down long enough to allow system 
administrators can fight them directly.   
B. CONSTANT VIGILANCE 
In addition to the countering techniques developed from the modeling of social 
engineering, one of the most effective countermeasures is having well-educated, security-
conscious employees. All employees throughout the organization need to be aware of the 
risks and remain vigilant (Barber, 2001).  The security policies and procedures should be 
taught to every new employee and repeated periodically for the entire organization. To 
repeatedly train employees is important to keeping their social-engineering awareness at 
a constant, high level.   
Stolen data could result in company closure and many unemployed personnel.  
When educating employees, it is not sufficient to simply tell them how they should 
behave. It is essential that they are aware of the reasons for the education and fully 
believe in the value of the time and effort put forth.  This is the reason employee buy-in is 
necessary to maintain a security-motivated team.  All employees must understand why 
they should behave in a certain way.  It is critical that management, as well as the rest of 
the organization, fully recognize and appreciate the awareness program.  There is no 
substitute for knowledgeable employees that realize the interdependency of their 
everyday actions with those of the rest of the organization.  
Since social engineers can attack any employee when attempting to gain illicit 
information, all employees should understand the social engineer’s methods of attack and 
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be aware of whom to trust when a problem occurs. Accountability is of key importance, 
and all employees should be responsible for all information they hold.  Because social 
engineers use deception as their main tool, it is important to be observant when giving out 
information.   Without exception, it is essential to authenticate the receiver of the 
information, since a social engineer often impersonates in order to deceive the victim. 
Security is vital to continued business success.  As such, we recommend using 
some combination of the following tools: videos, newsletters, brochures, signs, posters, 
screensavers, note pads, t-shirts, stickers, pictures of e-mail phishing, and audio clips.  A 
problem with the tools that the employees see every day is that they become monotonous 
and eventually ignored.  Therefore, educational material needs to appeal to all the senses 
and frequently be changed to be most useful.  In addition to these awareness tools, an 
internal website dedicated to security information, including social-engineering 
information, is a good way to keep all personnel informed, educated and vigilant.   
Authentic stories of social-engineering attacks, safety tips and informational stories 
posted on the intranet or in e-mail are helpful for educating employees regarding social-
engineering risks.  Using authentic stories when educating employees increases their 
resistance to social-engineering exploits (Arthurs, 2002). 
C. MULTIMODAL TRAINING 
Another very efficient countermeasure to social engineering is multimodal 
training.  The training that firefighters go through, in order to be competent when fire 
strikes, can save lives.   Similarly, the training that employees within an organization 
receive can impede a social engineer from accessing secured computer networks and 
threaten national security, which can also save lives.  If we agree that prevention and 
countering social-engineering attacks is essential for operational security, we must train 
with techniques analogous to those used to train firefighters. 
Multimodal training is simulated training that incorporates scenario-based 
learning with live attacker-victim interactions.  Scenario-based learning occurs in a 
context, situation, or social framework. It is based on the theory of situated cognition, 
which states that knowledge cannot be known and fully understood independent of its 
context (Kindley, 2002).  Rather than simply making employees sit through boring one-
way lectures, using interactive two-way simulations better conveys the dynamic nature of 
  46
social-engineering attacks.  Live-action scenarios enable the participants to more 
realistically experience social-engineering attacks.  The participant learns to react 
appropriately through recognition and practice. 
Multimodal training is based on interactive scenarios which, in turn, are grounded 
in the underlying close-access techniques that are utilized by social engineers in the 
situations described above.   Since it is not possible to create all possible social- 
engineering scenarios, it is sufficient to strive for scenarios that are as realistic as possible 
and that exemplify how the close-access techniques are carried out in different situations 
and for different target victims.  The participant’s level of preparedness concerning how 
to handle real-life attacks can be dramatically increased given sufficient practice. In order 
for this to work, however, the practice environment must be as similar as possible to the 
situations they are likely to encounter in the real world (Rotem, 2005). 
This type of training requires the learner to take action instead of simply listening. 
These exercises utilize more of the five senses by emulating various attack situations.  
Using audio, visual, a simulated attacker and a simulated environment, the interactive 
training could present illicit requests and highlight the appropriate choices that employees 
should make when they are confronted by an actual social engineer.  The goal is for this 
multimodal training to take people from a state of not knowing how to act in an 
information-dispatching situation to a state where they know how to successfully thwart 
social-engineering attacks.  
D. FUTURE WORK 
Since social engineering is a diverse and complex phenomenon, the prevention 
and countermodels to be used when fighting social engineering must contend with this 
complexity.   The overall goal of the educational model described here is to increase 
awareness of how a social engineer performs an attack and how one can protect against 
such attacks.  Knowledge of attacks is helpful in fighting them, so social-engineering 
attacks, both those that succeed and those that fail, should be made public whenever 
possible.  Learning from mistakes and improving prevention must override any concerns 
regarding bad reputation or loss of business.   
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Long-term research should focus on educating future leaders and commanders 
concerning the social-engineering threat.  Additionally, organizational policy must grant 
enough authority to question management in order to counter the attack of a social 
engineer impersonating management.   With these defense-in-depth recommendations, 
the user should be able to recognize the different approaches of the social engineer and be 
able to act accordingly.  Lastly, research into the methods of phishing is recommended.  
Phishing is one of the most prevalent and costly forms of social engineering today, and its 
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